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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

RONALD E. WRIGHT and
SUSAN-R. RIDING,
Defendants-Appellants.

:
:
:

Case No. 860298-CA

Category No. 2

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED QN APPEAL
The following issues are presented in this appeal:
1.

Are defendants entitled to reversals of any of

their convictions on the basis of entrapment?
2.

Was there sufficient evidence to support defendant

Wright's convictions of two counts of distribution of a
controlled substance for value on December 28, 1985?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ronald E. Wright, was charged with four
counts of distribution of a controlled substance for value,
second and third degree felonies, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-378(1) (a) (ii) (1986) (amended 1987) (W.R. 16-18) .*
Defendant, Susan R. Riding, was charged with two counts
of arranging the distribution of a controlled substance for
value, second and third degree felonies, under UTAH CODE ANN. §
* Although defendants were tried together, two record volumes,
one for each defendant, have been filed on appeal. "W.R." refers
to Wright's record volume, and "R.R." refers to Riding's record
volume.

58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1986) (amended 1987)f and one count of
distribution of a controlled substance for value, a third degree
felony, under § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (R.R. 16-17).
After a joint bench trial, the court found defendant
Wright guilty as charged and defendant Riding guilty of the two
counts of arranging.

With respect to the distribution charge, it

ruled that Riding had been entrapped.

The court sentenced Wright

to the Utah State Prison for terms of zero to five years on the
distribution of marijuana counts and terms of one to fifteen
years on the distribution of cocaine and methamphetamine counts
(the sentences to run concurrently) , and ordered him to pay $315
to Metro Narcotics Task Force.

It sentenced Riding to the Utah

State Prison for concurrent terms of zero to five years and one
to fifteen years on the two counts of arranging and fined her
$2,500, but suspended the prison terms and $1,500 of the fine and
ordered her to serve thirty days in the Davis County Jail (W.R.
35-36, R.R. 29-30, S.R. 3 ) . 2
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The State's only witness, Detective Lon Brian of the
Davis Narcotics Strike Force, and defendants gave conflicting
testimony at trial.

The following facts established through

Brian's testimony support defendants' convictions.
On December 28, 19 85 at approximately 6:00 p.m., Brian
met defendant Riding's stepbrother, Scott O'Brien, at a bar in
West Bountiful to pursue information O'Brien had provided police
2

"S.R." refers to the supplemental record filed with the Court
on May 18, 19 87.
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concerning defendants as possible drug suppliers.

After

discussing the possibility of purchasing some drugs that evening,
Brian drove with O'Brien to defendants' residence where Brian,
acting undercover, eventually purchased a small quantity of
marijuana for fifteen dollars from Riding.

Before Brian left,

Riding gave him a price list for larger quantities of marijuana
and told him that he could obtain more later that evening (T. 513).
At approximately 10:15 p.m. that evening, Brian and
O'Brien returned to defendants' residence and made contact with
Riding at the front door.

She eventually escorted them into the

kitchen where defendant Wright showed Brian a bag of marijuana
and told him that it would cost seventy-five dollars.

Riding

then handed Brian a small package of cocaine which Wright
indicated would cost one hundred thirty-five dollars.

After

Brian and Wright agreed on a price of two hundred dollars for
both the cocaine and the marijuana, Brian handed Wright the money
in exchange for the drugs (T. 15-20) .
After the 2 8th, Brian had some contact with Wright in
person and over the telephone, but no drugs were purchased.
Wright refused to deliver drugs to Brian in the Kaysville area
because Wright "didn't like [that] area."

However, on January

17, 1986, Brian went to Wright's residence and purchased
marijuana and methamphetamines ("crosstops") from him (T. 21-25,
32, 125-27).
As noted by defendants, O'Brien did not testify at
trial, and thus there were no details from him about his
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relationship with defendants•

Wright indicated that he had known

O'Brien "pretty well . . . for a few years," and had previously
worked with him for "about two years."

He described their

relationship as a social one (T. 43). Riding testified that she
had known O'Brien as her stepbrother for about twelve years
(since the time each was eight-years-old) (T. 68-69), and that
she had given him marijuana in exchange for money in December
1985 because he was her stepbrother (T. 77-78).
Defendants, and their witnesses1 versions of what
occurred on the dates in question are set forth in defendants1
brief (Br. of Apps. at 3-8) and need not be repeated here. It
will suffice to say that the defense witnesses1 accounts of the
pertinent facts differ in a number of important respects from the
account given by Detective Brian.
SUMMARY QF ARgUMEjNf
Under the statute and Utah Supreme Court decisions
relevant to entrapment, defendants are not entitled to reversals
of any of their convictions on a theory of entrapment.

They have

not shown that the tactics used by the police fell below
standards of acceptable police conduct, or that those tactics
created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by
one not otherwise ready to commit it.

Both defendants were

simply afforded the opportunity to commit the offense.
Defendant Wright's insufficiency of evidence claim
should be disposed of under State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah
1986), which is controlling on the question he presents.

ARGUMENT
PQSNT I
NEITHER DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE ANY
CONVICTIONS REVERSED ON THE BASIS OF
ENTRAPMENT.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to reversals of
their convictions because the undercover officer entrapped them.
After a brief discussion of the law of entrapment in Utah, the
entrapment claim will be addressed as it relates to each
defendant.

A.

The Applicable Law

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(1) (1978) states:
It is a defense that the actor was
entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting in
co-operation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit
an offense does not constitute entrapment.
This section is patterned after Model Penal Code § 2.13(1), which
sets forth a purely objective test of entrapment.

See State v.

Taylor. 599 P.2d 496, 502-03 (Utah 1979); Perkins and Boyce,
Criminal fraw 1171 (3d ed. 1982).

In TaylQI, the Utah Supreme

Court provided a clear definition of the objective test:
Under the objective view of entrapment,
the focus is not on the propensities and
predisposition of the specific defendant, but
on whether the police conduct revealed in the
particular case falls below standards, to
which common feelings respond, for the proper
use of governmental power. This concept
establishes entrapment on its historical
basis, the refusal to countenance a
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perversion of justice by government
misconduct. The objective view provides a
solid definitive standard upon which the
defense can rest, i.e., does the conduct of
the government comport with a fair and
honorable administration of justice?
599 P.2d at 500.

The objective test focuses entirely on the

conduct of the police and their helpers; matters such as the
defendant's character, his predisposition to commit the offense,
and his subjective intent are irrelevant.

IcL. at 503; State v.

EEickSgn* 722 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1986); State v. Cripps, 692
P.2d 747, 750 n. 3 (Utah 1984); People v. Barraza, 153 Cal. Rptr.
459, 468, 591 P.2d 947, 956 (1979); Perkins and Boyce, supra at
1171.3
Notwithstanding the clear definition of the objective
test provided in Taylor, the Supreme Court, in some of its recent
entrapment cases, has not always been particularly careful in
applying the objective test, seemingly reincorporating the
"predisposition" element of the subjective test.

For example, in

State v, Sprague, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), the Court stated:
[W]e concluded that the offense was induced
by the persistent requests by [the undercover
agent], not fry th3 initiative apd_dgsjre Qt
680 P.2d at 406 (emphasis added).

J

In St^te vt Cripps, the Court

The subjective test of entrapment focuses primarily on the
defendant's predisposition to commit the offense. Taylor» 599
P.2d at 501. Under this test, the defense of entrapment is
denied to defendants who had a preexisting criminal intent, no
matter how overreaching the law enforcement activity may have
been. State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 151, 369 P.2d 494, 496
(1962); People v. Mclntire, 153 Cal. Rptr. 237, 239, 591 P.2d
527, 529 (1979) .

at one point concluded:
Therefore/ only police conduct that "entraps"

692 P.2d at 750*

These statements/ which do not appear to be

consistent with either the language of § 76-2-303(1) or the
interpretation of that statute in laylfli, are at best confusing.
Presumably/ they are not intended to modify XsxlflX in such a way
as to create a hybrid objective/subjective test*
P.2d at 750 n. 3. fij. I&lQLi

See CripES* 692

599 P.2d at 504 (Hall/ J.#

concurring in result)• 4
* A most recent entrapment decision/ State v. Kaufman/ 52 Utah
Adv. Rep. 30/
P*2d„_ (1987)/ where the Supreme Court appears
to have again strayed from a true application of the objective
test/ drew the following criticism from one legal commentator:
This case is another decision where the
Supreme Court speaks in terms of the
objective standard of entrapment but actually
applies a subjective standard. Whether the
offenses were committed because of inducement
of the undercover officer is not the
standard. The standard is whether the
conduct of the officer was such that it would
induce a person to commit an offense they
otherwise would not commit. The opinion
simply does not focus on what conduct the
officer engaged in that was inappropriate.
The trial court's remarks appear to be no
more than sexist gratuities and offer little
guidance as to what conduct is proper and
what is not. It is apparent from the
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court that it
is never going to deal with the objective
standard of entrapment in the way that
concept was intended to be applied. The
better approach would be for the Legislature
to repeal the entrapment statute and start
over with a sounder statement of when a
defendant should be able to claim such a
defense.
Boyce/ "Supreme Court Summaries/" Intermountain Commercial
Record/ Feb. 27/ 1987f at 36/ col. 2.
-7-

Therefore, it is important for this Court to avoid the
problems experienced by the Supreme Court in this area and to
apply the objective test in strict accordance with Utah's
entrapment statute.

Two Supreme Court cases —

State v. Martin*

713 P.2d 60 (Utah 1986), and State v. Erickso^, 722 P.2d at 75859 —

are excellent examples of the objective test properly

defined and applied.

B.

anight's Entrapment Claim

Wright presents two entrapment arguments.

First, he

contends that his relationship with O'Brien and O'Brien's
stepsister. Riding, was impermissibly played upon by the
undercover officer during the December 28th drug transaction©.
He concludes, without reference to anything in the record, that
"these relationships no doubt indicate that Wright considered
O'Brien to be a member of his family, and he was thus willing to
do favors for O'Brien that he would not do for others."
Apps. at 20.

Br. of

However, there appears to be nothing in the record

to support such a conclusion; see State v. Binghanu 684 P.2d 43,
46 (Utah 1984) (the Court cannot rule on matters outside the
trial court record); rather, Wright's own testimony indicates
that his relationship with O'Brien was not a close personal one
(T. 43). Thus, the "appeals based primarily on . . . close
personal friendship" condemned in Taylor» 599 P.2d at 503, as
prohibited police conduct were not present here.

The methods

used by Detective Brian on the 28th simply did not create a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. ty^rtin. 713 P.2d at 61-62.

Second, Wright claims that Brian's high pressure
tactics prior to the drug transaction on January 17 constituted
entrapment*

He relies heavily on his own testimony concerning

Brian's repeated telephone calls and visits even in the face of
Wright's refusals to sell him drugs, and effectively asks this
Court to ignore Brian's testimony which suggested that Wright
gave no indications that he did not wish to sell drugs to Brian
again.

As with any trier of factf the trial court was free to

accept whatever version of the facts it wished.

That it

apparently chose to believe Brian's testimony and to disbelieve
Wright's is not grounds for reversing the decision on entrapment.
State V, UJell, 728 P.2d 131 f 132-33 (Utah 1986).
v. Moncada,

P.2d

£££

SLLZQL

fitatfi

, Ut. Ct. App. No. 860243-CA, slip op. at 1

(filed May 14 f 1987).

Under Brian's version of the factsf there

were none of the personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals to
extreme vulnerability present in recent entrapment cases before
the Supreme Court.

Martin. 713 P.2d at 62.

See flisa JSlifiJiafillF

722 P.2d at 758-59.
In sum, the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the trial court's decisionf does not as a matter of
law leave a reasonable doubt that defendant was entrapped.
Mfiilr 728 P.2d at 133.
C. Riding's Entrapment Claim
Riding argues that she was entrapped with respect to

all of her criminal conduct on December 2 8.

She relies

exclusively on her stepsister relationship to O'Brien as a basis
for this argument.

However, there is nothing in the record to

indicate that the undercover officer's use of that family
relationship was unconscionable under the circumstances.
Riding's arranging of the sale of marijuana and cocaine by her
co-defendantf Wright, to Brian was sufficiently detached from her
relationship with her stepbrother that the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that there was no entrapment.
relationship to her

Although the

stepbrother obviously opened the door to the

subsequent dealings with Brian, it was not used to pressure her
into committing the offenses in the face of clear reluctance to
do so.

Indeed, when viewed in a light most favorable to the

lower court's decision, the record supports the conclusion that
there was little or no reluctance by Riding to deal with Brian,
without regard to Brian's "friendship" with her stepbrother. ££•
State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 123 8 (Utah 19 80) (where the concern
was that undercover officers persisted in attempting to purchase
drugs without any prior reason to believe that the defendants
were using or selling drugs); People v. Mclntire, 153 Cal. Rptr.
237, 240, 591 P.2d 527, 530 (1979) (condemning police
manipulation of an impressionable high school youth to pressure
his unwilling sister (the defendant) into supplying him with
marijuana).

Brian merely gave Riding the opportunity to commit

5

The trial court ruled that Riding was entrapped on the
distribution charge, but found no entrapment on the arranging
charges.
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an offense she had committed before —
constitute entrapment.

S 76-2-303(1).

conduct that does not
Q£.

S£a££_£A_SflIflU£hi£n#

571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977) (where an officer had made repeated
requests for marijuana from a student who used marijuana, but
gave no indication that he would become involved in selling it)•
Brian's use of the familial relationship, although perhaps
unacceptable to Riding personally, was not the sort of police
tactic that falls below acceptable standards.
P.2d at 503.

££fi lazlQLr

5 99

Finally, insofar as the court's finding of

entrapment on the distribution charge appears inconsistent with
Riding's convictions for arranging, that is not grounds for
reversal of the convictions.

£Jta££_Y.i._S££B3J:±# 729 P.2d 610,

611,flD-ifiheatinar729 P.2d 612, 13-14 (Utah 1986)

THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
WRIGHT'S CONVICTIONS OF THE OFFENSES
COMMITTED ON DECEMBER 2 8.
Wright argues that, even though Brian may have given
him two hundred dollars in exchange for marijuana and cocaine on
December 28, because the State failed to present any evidence
that her retained any of that money for himself, his convictions
for distribution of the controlled substances should be reversed
under jS£3±£^Yx-Qn±iYfiIflSr 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983).

The Utah

Supreme Court recently rejected a nearly identical argument in
£U££_X.*_Q&2llf 728 P.2d at 133-34 (Utah 1986).

That decision,

which is controlling, requires resolution of defendant's
insufficiency issue against him.

Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendants'
convictions should be affirmed.
DATED this _J?£5rday of May, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON
/
Assistant Attorney General
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to Robert Van Sciver and Margo L. James, Attorneys for
Appellants, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this
i^^~3ay of May, 19 87.

